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NOTE TO EDITORS:
Enclosed is a summary of the findings of the
Investigating Board appointed to examine and report
on the May 10, 1967 landing accident involving the
MZ-F2 lifting body research vehicle at Edwards, Calif.
(A copy of the M-2 accident report is available at
NASA Headquarters, Room 6043, 400 Maryland Ave., SW.,
Washington; NASA Hq. _ffice of Advanced Research and
Technology, Room 647, 600 Independence Ave., SW; and
at the Public Affairs Office, NASA Flight Research Center,
Edwards, Calif.)
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Washington_ D, C.
_2-F2 Lifting Body Accident Summary
On May 10p 1967j the experimental M2-F2 lifting-body
vehicle crashed in landing on Rogers Dry Lake at the NASA
Flight Research Center_ Edwards m California. The vehicle
was piloted by Bruce A. Peterson_ NASA research pilot and
engineer. The M2-F2 was extensively damaged and Peterson
sustained severe facial injuries.
An eight-man investigating board was appointed to
determine factors leading to the accidentp analyze the
resultsj and make recommendations to minimize the possibility
of similar occurrences in future flights.
The MY-F2 vehicle is one of the configurations used in
a flight research program to investigate the problems and
potentialities of piloted spacecraft that in the future may
re-enter the atmosphere and be maneuvered to ground landings.
The program to date has concentrated on subsonic glide and
landings,
The May I0 flight was the 16th for the M2-F2. The
research vehicle was released into unpowered flight from
beneath the wing of the B-52 airplane at an altitude of
about 45p000 feet, The flight path was a standard U-shaped
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pattern with three legs and two left turns. Planned
research maneuvers were conducted on the first two legs.
The third leg was the landing approach. Prior to air drops
the pilot announced his intention to change the heading of
the landing approach path to angle across the runway to
reduce crosswind effects. This called for the pilot to
make a slight S-turn (left s then right) on the approach
legs prior to landing s which is common practice.
The flight was normal through the second left turn
into the approach leg. In coming out of this turn s leveling
from a banked conditions a lateral oscillation (rolling from
side to side) developed and quickly increased in amplitude.
Using established techniquess the pilot was able to
correct the roll condition and regain control of the vehicle
in 11 seconds.
By the time of recovery from the violent oscillation s
the M2-F2's approach heading was to the left and angled away
from the runway markings on the lake bed. The pilot found
it necessary to immediately begin the landing flare without
further heading changes,
The heading to which the pilot was committed left
him without the runway-type markings normalIp used for
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both landing direction and visual height cues and placed
the vehicle on a flight path that caused him to be disturbed
by the possibility of collision with the rescue helicopter
hovering left of the runway markings.
Additionally_ the violent roll motion had forced the
chase plane pilots to swerve a safe distance away and placed
them out of position to provide the normal altitude callouts
via radio to the M2-F2 pilot.
The M2°F2 completed its landing flare and contacted
the ground just as the descent (vertical) velocity was
arrested and before the landing gear was extended, After
bouncingp sliding and rolling over several times_ the vehicle
came to rest upside down. Landing occurred without the _2-F2
impacting the retreating helicopter which was several hundred
feet away laterally.
The investigating board found that the immediate cause
of the accident was an unusually low landing flare maneuver
and premature ground contact. The board concluded that
this was the result of an unusual set of circumstances that
individually would not have ended i_ an accident, The major
circumstances most pertinent as contributing factors were:
a. The pilot was overburdened in his normally
exacting task by a combination of events that
disoriented and distracted him and denied him
normal height information.
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b. The large amplitude roll oscillation during final
approach that caused a temporary loss of lateral
control of the research vehicle and changed the
landing heading.
c. Potential collision with the rescue helicopter
hovering near the path of the imposed landing
heading.
d. Lack of visual height cues in landing area to
which the pilot was committed.
e. Unavoidable absence of radioed altitude callouts
from chase aircraft.
The major pertinent recommendations of the board
include:
(1) Ways should be sought to ease pilot workloads
in landing lifting-body-type vehicles. Consider-
ation should be given to increasing the time
allotted to the pilot for the landing phase and
to improving the lateral-directional handling
qualities to which the pilot is exposed during
the landing phase,
(2) During landings of unconventional aircraft, the
lake bed should be kept clear_ not only in the
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immediate, planned landing area but also in a
much larger area in which an inadvertent landing
might take place.
(5} Research flight planning, briefing, and monitoring
procedures should be reviewed with the intent of
improving the flow of information and insuring
that all participants are kept adequately informed.
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